Prof Patry on a sufficiently original insurance policy that was protectable under copyright.
This is the second time I’ve used an insurance topic as a pretense to link to the Monty Python skit where Mr. Devious tells the Vicar that unfortunately the Vicar had purchased the ‘NeverPay’ policy where ‘it states quite clearly that no claim you make will be paid.’

EFF amicus brief by Fred von Lohnmann and Wendy Seltzer in Elektra v. Barker, a Southern District of NY case on file-sharing:
From the Background and Summary of Argument:
Defendant Denise Barker, like more than 19,000 others, is accused by several major record companies of using peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing software to download and upload music. When individuals use P2P file sharing software to make unauthorized copies of sound recordings, record companies are within their rights to sue them for making unauthorized reproductions. See 17 U.S.C. Section 106(1) (exclusive right of reproduction). In the thousands of suits filed thus far, however, the record companies have also alleged infringement of their distribution rights under 17 U.S.C. Section 106(3), apparently in hopes that an expansive judicial interpretation of the distribution right may support quick summary judgments based on the bare fact that a defendant has “offered” files for download.
Not all “distributions,” however, infringe Section 106(3). The Copyright Act grants to copyright owners the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. Section 106(3). The plain language of the Act – as well as legislative history, historical practice, and binding Second Circuit precedent – requires that a physical, tangible, material object change hands before the distribution right can be infringed. Plaintiffs’ complaint ignores this plain statutory language and instead attempts to expand Section 106(3) to encompass intangible transmissions between computers over the Internet.
To support their view, Plaintiffs cite a handful of rulings, none binding on this Court, that include loose language regarding the Section 106(3) right. None of those rulings includes any analysis of the question posed by Plaintiffs’ complaint here: do intangible computer network transmissions infringe the Section 106(3) right? In brushing past this threshold question, Plaintiffs fail to mention the most relevant Second Circuit precedent, see Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995), or the leading scholarly treatment of the issue, see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected Solution to the Controversy Over RAM Copies, 2001 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 83, 122-38 (2001) (hereafter “Reese, The Public Display Right”), both of which reject Plaintiffs’ view.
Expanding Section 106(3) to include transmissions would not only contravene the plain statutory language, but would upset settled expectations in a variety of contexts and upset the delicate balance struck by Congress in the Copyright Act. Congress has enacted several copyright limitations, exceptions and statutory licenses based on the assumption that transmissions are properly encompassed by the public performance right, not the distribution right. Treating Internet transmissions as “distributions” under Section 106(3) threaten those statutory provisions.
Accordingly, because “the distribution right as currently framed… does not appear to encompass transmissions of copyrighted works over computer networks,” Reese, The Public Display Right, at 126-27, and because Plaintiffs did not (and cannot) allege that Ms. Barker transferred any material objects embodying sound recordings, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ distribution claim.

Footnotes omitted.
EFF discussion of case here.

doubleknit.jpg
From the website for The Double Knit Era:
Details of every team’s uniform jerseys are provided- front, back and patches, going back to the beginning of the Double Knit Era. This new THIRD EDITION for 2005 is over 1050 pages and includes more than 6000 photographs. It chronicles every detail change for every uniform jersey in the Major League Baseball going back over thirty five years.
There is a lot of information compiled here that can not be found anywhere else. Whether you are a collector checking authenticity, a dealer ensuring the correct details of what you are buying or selling, or just a hobbyist with a passion to see “one of every style”, this Collectors’ Reference is the most detailed source on the topic that exists today.

When things are slow, go to TTABVUE and put in ‘Sentra’ as a search term, to pull up the applications that Leo Stoller has filed extension requests to oppose. He appears to have 25 requests approved this week alone.
It is my understanding that Stoller is sending out requests for $10,000 to these applicants. One of my clients has received such a letter (the letter also notes that to defend a TTAB proceeding would cost $150,000).
I have been told that Stoller has filed 500 extension requests since November.
What are the odds that someone would have superior trademark rights to 500 of the marks that have been published for opposition since November?
What is the duty of the PTO to protect trademark applicants from, for want of a better term, something that appears to be a scheme?

Raustiala and Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design,’ UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 06-04 (Jan 2006). Abstract:
“The orthodox justification for intellectual property is utilitarian. Advocates for strong IP rights argue that absent such rights copyists will free-ride on the efforts of creators and stifle innovation. This orthodox justification is logically straightforward and well reflected in the law. Yet a significant empirical anomaly exists: the global fashion industry, which produces a huge variety of creative goods without strong IP protection. Copying is rampant as the orthodox account would predict. Yet innovation and investment remain vibrant. Few commentators have considered the status of fashion design in IP law. Those who have almost uniformly criticize the current legal regime for failing to protect apparel designs. But the fashion industry itself is surprisingly quiescent about copying. Firms take steps to protect the value of trademarks, but appear to accept appropriation of designs as a fact of life. This diffidence about copying stands in striking contrast to the heated condemnation of piracy and associated legislative and litigation campaigns in other creative industries.
Why, when other major content industries have obtained increasingly powerful IP protections for their products, does fashion design remain mostly unprotected – and economically successful? The fashion industry is a puzzle for the orthodox justification for IP rights. This paper explores this puzzle. We argue that the fashion industry counter-intuitively operates within a low-IP equilibrium in which copying does not deter innovation and may actually promote it. We call this the “piracy paradox.” This paper offers a model explaining how the fashion industry’s piracy paradox works, and how copying functions as an important element of and perhaps even a necessary predicate to the industry’s swift cycle of innovation. In so doing, we aim to shed light on the creative dynamics of the apparel industry. But we also hope to spark further exploration of a fundamental question of IP policy: to what degree are IP rights necessary to induce innovation? Are stable low-IP equilibria imaginable in other industries as well?
Part I describes the fashion industry and its dynamics and illustrates the prevalence of copying in the industry. Part II advances an explanation for the piracy paradox that rests on two features: induced obsolescence and anchoring. Both phenomena reflect the status-conferring power of fashion, and both suggest that copying, rather than impeding innovation and investment, promotes them.
Part II also considers, and rejects, alternative explanations of the endurance of the low-IP status quo.
Part III considers extensions of our arguments to other fields. By examining copyright’s negative space – those creative endeavors that copyright does not address – we argue can we can better understand the relationship between copyright and innovation.'”
Counterfeit Chic discussion here.
Marginal Revolution discussion here.
1991 Law Review note: A Design for the Copyright of Fashion.

Barrett, ‘Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of ‘Trademark Use,‘ 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 371 (2006). Abstract:
“The Internet has provided countless new ways for ingenious businesses and individuals to refer to a plaintiff’s mark in a manner that impacts the plaintiff’s business. These new methods may not directly associate the mark with goods or services that the defendant is offering for sale and may be completely hidden from consumers’ view. In evaluating the numerous trademark infringement and dilution suits that these unauthorized references have generated, courts have often failed to focus on the appropriate role of the “trademark use” requirement, which has traditionally limited the scope of the trademark infringement (and more recently, trademark dilution) cause of action. Some courts appear to have completely ignored the trademark use limitation, while others have acknowledged the limitation but construed it in a manner that undercuts or distorts it. This has given rise to a number of splits in the Circuit Courts of Appeals. This Article undertakes to bring some focus and coherence to the trademark use issue in the Internet context. It provides an in-depth examination of the history and purpose of the limitation and proposes a modern, general definition of “trademark use” in light of that history and purpose. It then demonstrates how this definition should apply in several important contexts on the Internet.”
HT Prof Goldman, who provides other links to law review articles on the same topic.