Trump filed a defamation claim against the NY Times and Times reporters on Monday (text of complaint in Trump v New York Times Company, et. al. , 8:25-cv-02487 (MD Fla September 15, 2025)

Today, Judge Steven Merryday, citing the Fed Rule 8 requirement that complaints are to be short and plain statements of the claims, dismissed sua sponte the 85 page complaint without prejudice, criticizing the 45 page build-up to the statement of the claims, noting:

“. . . a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place for the tedious and burdensome aggregation of prospective evidence, for the rehearsal of tendentious arguments, or for the protracted recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader’s claim for relief. As every lawyer knows (or is presumed to know), a complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective — not a protected platform to rage against an adversary. A complaint is not a megaphone for public relations or a podium for a passionate oration at a political rally or the functional equivalent of the Hyde Park Speakers’ Corner.“

Trump now has 28 days to replead (limited to 40 pages), “in accord with the rules of procedure and in a professional and dignified manner.”

Text of Judge Merryday order in Trump v Times dismissal w/o prejudice

Text of complaint in Trump v New York Times Company, et. al. , 8:25-cv-02487 (MD Fla September 15, 2025)

The New York Times published three articles about Trump in the run-up to the ’24 election. Two Times reporters also published a book: “Lucky Loser: How Donald Trump Squandered His Father’s Fortune and Created the Illusion of Success.”

Trump has now brought a $15 Billion defamation suit against the Times and the publisher of the book, in the Middle District of Florida. The complaint is linked to below. The alleged defamatory statements begin on page 45 and run through page 63 of the 85 page complaint.

Many of the challenged statements pertain to Trump’s background in his father’s business, and to Trump’s own business career. While must of the challenged statements contain serious allegations of impropriety, one challenged statement is:

“After experiencing years of sensory overload in jungles around the world, the first thing Burnett’s producers noticed when they arrived on the twenty-sixth floor of Trump Tower was the stink, a musty and moldy carpet smell that seemed to emanate from every corner. As they walked through, with eyes trained to notice small details, they saw the chipped wood on seemingly every piece of furniture.” – Statement (p), page 53.

Text of Trump v New York Times Company, et. al. , 8:25-cv-02487 (MD Fla September 15, 2025)

AL INFINITY LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HERSCHEL SPALTER, ISSER BOYARSKY, DOES 1-10, Defendants-Appellees,CROWN CELL INC., Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee, WESTVIEW INDUSTRIES, INC., Third-Party-Defendant. 24-1412, (Second Circuit July 15, 2025)

District Court’s Error on Authorization and Burden of Proof:

    ◦ The district court initially granted summary judgment for the defendants because it found that AL Infinity had failed to present evidence that Fenda was not authorized to manufacture the speakers.

    ◦ It reasoned that information about authority was “uniquely within [AL Infinity’s] control” and found the “absence of evidence” telling, given that Fenda “was at one point authorized to produce Altec Lansing goods”.

    ◦ The district court concluded that if the goods were not “inauthentic”—meaning manufactured without legal authority—then the predicate for all of AL Infinity’s claims (including trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, and related New York state law claims) no longer existed.

• Appellate Court’s Reversal Based on AL Infinity’s Evidence:

    ◦ The appellate court disagreed, concluding that AL Infinity did create a genuine dispute of fact.

    ◦ Sworn Affidavit: AL Infinity’s principal asserted by sworn affidavit that AL Infinity, as the owner of the Altec Lansing brand, had not consented to Fenda’s production of the speakers. This affidavit further stated that the specific speaker models had not been part of AL Infinity’s product line since its acquisition of the brand in 2012, nor in the prior owner’s line for years before that. The court found this “sufficient evidence to support an inference that the Altec Lansing branded speakers that Fenda supplied to Crown Cell in 2016 and 2017 were manufactured without the consent of the owner of the trademark”.

    ◦ Rejection of Defendants’ “Prior Authorization” Argument: The defendants argued that AL Infinity had conceded Fenda and Westview were once authorized, and therefore AL Infinity bore the burden to prove these authorizations were terminated. The appellate court rejected this:

        ▪ Fenda’s Past Authorization: While Fenda (or its affiliate Fenda Industrial) had past agreements (like the 2004 MOU and 2009 agreement) to manufacture goods as a supplier to prior Altec Lansing owners, these agreements did not suggest Fenda had the authority to manufacture the speakers on its own account or for sale to other purchasers like Westview, especially not in 2016 or 2017. The court found these documents did not provide a basis to require AL Infinity to prove the termination of Fenda’s limited authority.

        ▪ Westview’s Past Authorization: The court noted that the Amendment to Sales Representative Agreement, which reflected Westview’s past authority to solicit orders for Altec Lansing products, itself stated that Westview “shall no longer be appointed to solicit orders for the Altec Lansing Products” as of December 1, 2009. This document effectively satisfied any potential burden on AL Infinity to show the cessation of Westview’s authority.

    ◦ Insufficient Rebuttal: The court found that the specific evidence presented by Crown Cell regarding past authorizations did not conclusively rebut AL Infinity’s sworn statement that the speakers were manufactured without authorization. The court implied that if Crown Cell wished to contend the speakers were manufactured before 2012 under a prior authorization, or solicited under existing authority, Crown Cell would need to present evidence to support that.

In essence, the holding is based on the appellate court’s determination that AL Infinity provided sufficient evidence (via its principal’s sworn affidavit) to create a genuine factual dispute over whether the speakers were unauthorized, thereby meeting its prima facie burden for trademark infringement and counterfeiting. The defendants’ arguments relying on past, limited authorizations were deemed insufficient to eliminate this factual dispute, as those authorizations did not pertain to the independent manufacturing and sale activities in question. This meant the case was not ripe for summary judgment, and the factual dispute needed to be resolved in further proceedings.

Schedule A defendant (SAD) anti-counterfeiting lawsuits tend to be filed in the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of Florida. Judge Ranjan, noting an “uptick in such cases” in the W.D. Penn (home to the city of Pittsburgh) issued a “re-examination” of how they are procedurally administered. The court’s six guidelines are very similar to the five procedural concerns highlighted by Judge Kness in the N.D. Illinois.

“Schedule A defendant” refers to the captions of such suits – the complaint lists so many defendants that they must be listed in a schedule attached to the complaint.

Below is a summary of the order drafted by robots at Google Notebook LM, which I only lightly edited (full text of the order in the link at the bottom):

The Standing Order on “Schedule A” Cases is issued by the Court due to a noticeable uptick in such cases in the District, prompting a re-examination of how they are procedurally administered. While acknowledging the serious problem of counterfeit sales and the need for IP holders to obtain meaningful relief against online foreign sellers, the Court notes that Schedule A litigation has led to “gradual and oftentimes bizarre modifications from how normal litigation is conducted,” likely for efficiency.

The Court identifies several issues that have become common in Schedule A cases but are rare in other civil litigation:

• Preemptive requests to be excused from Hague Convention service and translation requirements for foreign service.

• Frequent ex parte motions for Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) seeking to freeze all defendants’ assets, often before evidence of asset movement and without being narrowly tailored.

• Distortion of rules regarding joinder (Rule 20) and personal jurisdiction, often involving hundreds of defendants and disparate intellectual property, and suing without a sound basis for contacts into the forum. The Court views many of these modifications as “extraordinary exceptions to the normal rules” driven by the economics of the litigation.

To address these issues and ensure that rules and law are followed, the Court provides six procedural guidelines it intends to employ:

• 1. Rule 20 Compliance and Complaint Structure:

    ◦ Each complaint must name a single defendant or group of defendants acting under the same operator, requiring a separate filing fee for each.

    ◦ This is crucial because personal jurisdiction will be a defendant-specific inquiry based on sales into the forum state, making broad joinder impractical before personal jurisdiction is established.

    ◦ The Court is open to consolidating related cases once personal jurisdiction is confirmed and other consolidation factors are met.

•2. Rule 11 Compliance and Personal Jurisdiction Allegations:

    ◦ Complaints must plausibly plead allegations of personal jurisdiction, including specific contacts with the forum.

    ◦ Simply being an online seller on Amazon or the plaintiff creating jurisdiction by ordering a product to the forum is insufficient.

    ◦ Plaintiffs must have developed some evidence of each defendant’s contacts with the forum (e.g., sales information, distribution locations) before filing the complaint.

    ◦ While plaintiffs may claim this information isn’t readily available, Rule 11 requires evidentiary support for factual contentions, though the Court will consider jurisdictional discovery on a case-by-case basis if Rule 11’s threshold is met.

• 3. Ordinary Service Requirements and Hague Convention:

    ◦ The Court will not automatically allow plaintiffs to dispense with ordinary service requirements, including foreign service under the Hague Convention.

    ◦ A particularized, case-specific and defendant-specific showing is required for alternate service.

    ◦ Motions for alternate service must detail efforts to discover domicile and effectuate service by usual means, and explain whether the requested alternate service is permitted by the Hague Convention.

    ◦ Conclusory assertions about the cost or time of Hague Convention methods are rejected.

    ◦ Plaintiffs can use waiver-of-service forms (emailed to defendants) to avoid Hague Convention service and save costs.

•4. Ex Parte TRO Motions:

    ◦ The Court does not intend, as a matter of course, to grant ex parte TRO motions.

    ◦ Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, and the Court will not grant TROs based on conclusory statements or without a sound basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

    ◦ The Court is unlikely to freeze online accounts without evidence that the defendant has transferred or is transferring assets to avoid judgment, and a specific showing linking the amount of frozen assets to the amount of disgorgement at issue.

    ◦ Prejudgment asset restraints are not meant simply to secure money for later damage recovery, and the typical justification for ex parte TROs (to generate settlement leverage) is noted.

• 5. Sealing Filings:

    ◦ Given that ex parte TRO motions are often the justification for sealing, the Court is unlikely to seal any filings.

    ◦ If a motion to seal is filed, it must meet specific legal grounds.

• 6. Declaration of Prior Cases:

    ◦ A complaint filing must be accompanied by a declaration from plaintiff’s counsel.

    ◦ This declaration must identify any prior pending cases brought by the plaintiff(s) against any named defendants, including case number(s), whether the IP was the same, and the status or disposition of those cases.

Ed note: I can’t answer the question as to how much the judges in the Northern District of Illinois and Southern District of Florida are influenced by the opinions of other judges in other circuits in these “Schedule A cases.” They’ve been going on their own with these suits all these years.

Text of Judge Rangan order.

SYSCO MACHINERY CORPORATION, a Taiwan corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DCS USA CORPORATION, d/b/a Dorey Converting Systems, a North Carolina corporation, Defendant-Appellee, No. 24-1675. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. July 9, 2025

“Yet one of the trade secret definitions Sysco used in its complaint includes “the Copyrighted Works,” a defined term that encompasses at least 23 apparently unredacted technical drawings deposited with the Copyright Office. J.A. 48. Sysco has not argued that it took any steps to preserve the confidentiality of those drawings or that there is a reason the Copyright Office did not make them open to public inspection. In context, we are convinced that any trade secrets Sysco might have had in those documents were “extinguished” when they were deposited. Sysco clarified at oral argument that it did not mean to include copyrighted works in the definition of its trade secrets, but its burden was to make that clear in the pleadings. The inclusion of copyrighted material is but another reason why Sysco has not plausibly alleged that it possessed a valid trade secret.”

IN RE: RANDY WAYNE WHITE, Appellant. No. 2024-1073. United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. (July 10, 2025).

The Board’s conclusion—that a consumer would understand the YUCATAN SHRIMP mark to convey information about the dish offered at Mr. White’s restaurant—is supported by substantial evidence.

TTABlog discussion of YUCATAN SHRIMP here.

The Scotts Co. v The Procter & Gamble Co., 2:24-cv-4199 (S.D. Ohio June 27, 2025)

Miracle-Gro has an incontestable registration for a green and yellow rectangle depicted below (the cross-hatching being the Trademark Office color-designation code our tm lawyer ancestors labored under when designating colors in trademark applications):

Miracle-Gro sells a lot of plant food using this trade dress and in other green and yellow shaped packages, but it also sells some products that look like this:

Your marketing team at Proctor, wants to use this packaging for a weed killer:

Would you clear this packaging, in view of Miracle-Gro’s registration (and common-law usages)?

Before you answer, you should know: Spruce is a weed killer while Miracle-Gro sells, for the most part, plant food – although it does sell weed preventer. These are not competitive but might appear in the same aisle at Home Depot. Someone might use both products in a single day of gardening (that’s how the court put it).

Also: the shade of Miracle-Gro’s green is a light green reminiscent of a lawn, while the shade of Spruce’s green is, uh, spruce green.

Also, third-party usages in the categories include:

OK, Miracle-Gro goes for a prelim injunction. More facts: no instances of actual confusion. And the surveys showed confusion or no confusion, depending on who they were representing.

Held: Prelim denied. Scott has a low likelihood of success, as the trade dresses are too dissimilar.

-the greens are very different;

-the Spruce package has a transparent section;

-the proportion of green to yellow are meaningfully different;

-the use of different packaging by Miracle-Gro reduces the distinctiveness of its gree/yellow trade dress;

-the Spruce package has a big yellow dandelion; and

-the word SPRUCE acts a differentiating housemark.

Text of Scotts v Procter here.

43(b)log discussion of Scott v Procter here.

DI Reed v. Joi Marshall; Tonya Harris, aka Tonya Kelly; Myracle Hollowway, 24-20198, (5th Cir. July 2, 2025)

“Critical to resolving this dispute is understanding that Reed, Marshall, and Harris entered into joint ownership of the JADE mark—that is, each individual owns a complete interest in the mark. Joint ownership of a mark has two interconnected problems. First, a mark is fundamentally intended to “identify and distinguish a single commercial source,” not three distinct owners. 2 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:40 (5th ed. 2025). Second, any discord between co-owners could result in “multiple, fragmented use” that may result in “consumer confusion and deception.” Id. It is for these reasons that “joint ownership of a trademark is disfavored in the law,” and that in the instances it does occur, parties often enter into “contractual agreements” to clarify outcomes should owner interests become unaligned. Id.

Here, the parties failed to enter into a contractual agreement that defined their respective obligations; and some of the mark’s co-owners have had a falling out with another set of co-owners. But at bottom, the question before us is simpler: whether the Lanham Act, which is aimed at protecting consumers and mark owners from fraud and deceptive acts, provides an appropriate cause of action to remedy disputes between the co-owners of a trademark. The answer, for the reasons discussed below, is “no.”“

Approximately 80% of Schedule A Defendant (“SAD”) counterfeiting suits are brought in the Northern District of Illinois. The name refers to the captioned name of the defendants – usually “The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A.”

SAD litigations have been a topic of controversy in recent years. Plaintiffs may make aggressive assertions as to service of process, joinder, and the use of urgent relief regarding freezing defendants’ assets – which claims often go unchallenged in default scenarios. This creates an opportunity for a plaintiff to freeze and seize a lot of ill-gotten gains in one lawsuit. The Northern District of Illinois had, until recently at least, been accommodating to these suits – giving rise to the meme: The Northern District of Illinois vs. The Internet.

Over the past few weeks a judge in the ND Ill, Judge John Kness, has issued an order staying all of his pending SAD suits ( 14 to my count). The Judge will “reassess” his view on these suits (however it is unclear to what extent the Judge will conduct any sort of fact-finding or briefing in this regard).

The order(which appears to be identical in all 14 suits) provides a handy bullet point list spot-lighting the procedural questions raised by these suits:

“MINUTE entry before the Honorable John F. Kness: On the Court’s initiative, all pending motions are held in abeyance, and the case is stayed pending further order. This stay, which the Court is entering in other so-called “Schedule A” cases on its docket where requests for temporary restraining orders remain pending, is intended to permit the Court the opportunity to reassess its previous approach in Schedule A litigation involving Lanham Act, Copyright Act, and Patent Act claims typically brought on an ex parte basis against various online merchants.

This reassessment will consider, among other things, whether:

(1) ex parte proceedings are appropriate in these types of cases;

(2) the routine sealing of parts or all of the docket is appropriate;

(3) the routine granting of temporary restraining orders on an ex parte basis is a sound exercise of judicial discretion;

(4) the routine granting of prejudgment asset restraints is a sound exercise of judicial discretion; and

(5) the mass joinder of defendants is appropriate under the circumstances typically present in Schedule A cases.

Plaintiff remains free, of course, to dismiss this action voluntarily if they wish to pursue their claims in another District, but no supplemental briefing on the pending motions may be filed absent advance leave of Court.” (emphasis and formatting added)

The following SAD cases on Judge Kness’ docket appear to be stayed at this time:

Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified On Schedule A, N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-06252

Universal City Studios LLC v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-05473

Garyck Truls Arntzen v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-05397

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-05874

Hong Kong Leyuzhen Technology Co. Limited v. yifang N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-03183

GJL Holding Company LLC v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04726

Jessica Rose Hanselmann v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04639

Judge Kness entered a stay, and plaintiffs withdrew their litigation without prejudice in:

Fendi S.R.L. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A et al N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04859

Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation v. The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liabiltiy (sic) Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A Hereto N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-01797

Spin Master Ltd. et al v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-03605

Spin Master Ltd. et al v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-03442

Pit Viper, LLC v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04516

Christian Dior Couture, S.A. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04096

Nike, Inc. v. The Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A N.D.Ill. 1:25-cv-04318

Prior press coverage on the growing resistance to SAD litgation reported here.

SHEIN and TEMU are Chinese online retail platforms known for selling a wide range of consumer goods like clothing, accessories, and home products at low prices.

The de minimis tariff exception refers to a rule that allows small-value imports to enter a country without being subject to customs duties and taxes. In the United States, for example, the de minimis value threshold is currently set at $800. This means that most goods imported into the U.S. with a value of $800 or less per shipment are exempt from duties and taxes.

The exemption with regard to China was suspended on Feb. 5., and then reinstated on Feb. 7. It is unclear what the status of the exemption is at this time.

This tariff exemption rule is designed to streamline customs procedures and reduce costs for both governments and businesses or consumers, as it simplifies the process for small, low-value shipments.

U.S. Customs (“CBP”) stated in October of last year that 92% of all cargo entering the U.S. were in de minimis shipments. JFK Airport receives up to 1 million de minimis shipments a day.

Meta reported in 2024 that Chinese advertisers accounted for 10% of its revenue. Temu reportedly spends the most ads on Facebook while Shein spends a significant amount as well.

Temu was one of the largest spenders during the 2024 Super Bowl.

On Feb. 5, CBP issued an order suspending the de minimis exception on goods from China.

On Feb. 7, the president paused the suspension.

Congress and the Biden Administration had previously contemplated suspending the tariff exemption.

Kash Patel, nominee to head the FBI, received $1 Million and $5 Million in restricted stock from the parent company of Shein, for consulting services. Shein intends to go public on the London Stock Exchange.

Discussion of issues relating to the de minimis exception here.

Previous efforts to oppose Shein discussed here.