W.D. Texas prelim: every thing is reducible to monetary damages:
TESORO REFINING & MARKETING COMPANY LLC, MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP, Plaintiffs, v. AK INC., REBEL LAND AND DEVELOPMENT LLC, SAMMER ANABI, RAWA ANABI, Defendants.
United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.January 22, 2026.
Defendants respond Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm because an adequate remedy at law exists, specifically monetary damages. ECF No. 36 at 13-22.
Plaintiffs must carry the burden on this element, and to do so “must demonstrate the threat of irreparable harm by independent proof, or no injunction may issue.” Randolph v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-02165, 2012 WL 2450016, at *4 (E.D. La. June 27, 2012) (citing White v. Carlucci, 862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989)). “Speculative injury is not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985). Ultimately, therefore, to obtain injunctive relief the moving party must show that irreparable harm is likely.[1] Moreover, under Fifth Circuit precedent, “a harm is irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, such as monetary damages.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011).
Thus, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that monetary damages are an insufficient remedy and that their alleged harms are not just possible, but likely.
BIRDIE GIRL GOLF, LLC v. MANY HATS ENTERPRISES, LLC, Dist. Court, SD New York 2026
SDNY – Cybersquatting – personal jurisdiction
“To establish personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim asserted must arise from that business activity.” Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006). Transacting business under Section 302(a)(1) requires “purposeful activity”—that is, “volitional acts” through which a defendant “avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Al Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 68 N.E.3d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted). The “second element of § 302(a)(1) is satisfied `when there exists an articulable nexus or a substantial relationship between transactions occurring within the state and the cause of action sued upon.'” Spetner v. Pal. Inv. Bank, 70 F.4th 632, 643 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2004)). This `”relatively permissive’ inquiry requires only that `at least one element [of the claim] arises from [the defendant’s] New York contacts.'” Id. (quoting Licci, 984 N.E.2d at 900-01); see also Am. Girl, 118 F.4th at 278-79.
Seventh Circuit elements of false advertising:
FIREBLOK IP HOLDINGS, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
HILTI, INC. AND RECTORSEAL, LLC, Defendants.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division.
Continued use of UL certification marl after certification was de-listed.
A false advertising claim has five elements:
(1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; (3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to defendant or by a loss of goodwill associated with its products.
Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1999).
A `literal’ falsehood is bald-faced, egregious, undeniable, over the top.” Schering-Plough Healthcare Products, Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2009).
The difference between false association and false advertising:
The text shows that false advertising and false association “are separate and distinct and have different elements needed to assert a prima facie case.” 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:9.50 (5th ed. May 2024); see also Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122 (“Section 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases of liability: false association, § 1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, § 1125(a)(1)(B).”). Because the asserted “presumption” is not consistent with the statutory language, the Court won’t use it.
In terms of public safety, it might not matter that RectorSeal told UL and FM that it was no longer making the Firestop Box Insert. But this opinion isn’t about public safety. It’s about the narrow issue of whether a jury could conclude that the continued use of the FM and UL certification marks on the Firestop Boxes’ label constituted false advertising or implied a false association. Because a jury could reach such a conclusion, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issues must be denied.