Google legal department should probably take the rest of August off.  There’s GOOGLES and FROOGLE and GMAIL. 

The GMAIL thing is interesting.  The press release announcing Google’s email service is dated April 1, however media broke the news on March 31.  One company, Cencourse, filed a trademark application for GMAIL for email services on March 31 claiming March 31 as a date of first use (so presumably there’s a specimen – but the applicant also checked the wrong box, claiming intent to use as well, so maybe there isn’t).  Two other companies filed applications claiming prior use.  Google filed an intent to use application on April 7. 

This article details the whole complex situation.

Apparently there’s also a Google IPO or something.

 

A recent Southern Distrct of NY case, Knight-McConnell v. Cummins, has been reported as holding that linking from defendant’s site to plaintiff’s site will not constitute trademark infringement.  There is also broad language that use of another’s trademark in a URL or pathname will not constitute trademark infringement. 

True, but the fact pattern is quirky.  This is a grudge match between two pro se parties in the rarefied world of high finance.  Plaintiff’s website talks stocks up and defendant’s website talks down those same stocks (and apparently talks down plaintiff as well – there is a libel charge in here – as defendant called plaintiff crazy, a crook, and fat).

In this context, defendant had no intention of anyone thinking that there was a connection between the parties, and, presumably, in order to trash plaintiff, defendant needed to make it very clear that there was no connection.  The court’s language about linking and pathnames should be read in that context (and the language does limit itself to this case).

Knight-McConnell v.Cummins, 2004 WL 1713824 (SDNY  July 29 2004) (Buchwald, J) (no online version available yet).

John Welch reports:

In Central Mfg. Co.. V. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., Opp. No. 91154585, the Board entered sanctions against Opposer in view of its determination that “Opposer’s Rule 11 motion lacked merit, and in view of other motions brought by opposer in this consolidated case that have been determined to be without merit, constitute harassment, and can only be assumed to have been brought for purposes of delay.”

A footnote refers to “other cases involving the conduct of Mr. Stoller, Central Mfg. and other related entities,” and provides a number of citations.

The order can be found at the TTABVUE website (paper no. 20, 2/19/04).